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Unfortunately, despite the deregulation of price and 
entry controls over the past three decades at the federal 
level in much of the transportation industry and some of the 
telecommunications industry, the U.S. legal landscape still 
is littered with legal entry barriers. These impediments exist 
primarily at the state and local levels, where they essentially 
have operated under the radar. 
This white paper outlines some of the remaining state 
barriers and a few federal ones and how they prevent 
disruptive innovations by entrepreneurs and established 
firms alike that potentially could bring new and more 
efficient business models to the market. In the case of the 
legal sector, the barriers we identify not only adversely 
affect legal innovation, but also impede innovation in 
other sectors of the economy. Similarly, in health care, 
pharmaceuticals, K–12 education, the financing of growth 
businesses, and many consumer services, legal obstructions 
hinder innovation and the provision of efficient, affordable, 
high-quality services and products. 
We conclude by surveying the main options for 
reducing or eliminating these impediments, proposing, 
in effect, ways to provide a “license to grow.” Although 
most of the ideas we list are relevant only to state and 
local governments, we do not recommend, however 
tempting it may be, federal preemption as the means to 
their abolition. Apart from the political difficulty of gaining 
consensus on a sensible preemption approach in a time of 
deep partisanship with the Congress, it is not necessary for 
citizens to look to Washington to solve all problems.
There is value not only in state experimentation, 
but danger in one-size-fits-all proscriptions imposed by 
the federal government. Therefore, we opt instead for a 
more flexible “mutual recognition” approach that would 
require some federal action—a simple law requiring states 
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to recognize licenses granted in other states’ licensing 
systems—but not a detailed set of universally applicable 
limits on states’ licensing systems. Fortunately, there 
are models for mutual recognition. For example, driver’s 
licenses are recognized in all states in the country, while the 
European Union uses mutual recognition in the regulation 
of financial matters. 
To be sure, it is important that state and local licensing 
reforms ensure that consumers can make informed choices 
among providers once existing restrictions are lifted, and 
that they are protected from provider abuses. But existing 
barriers to entry are not the only means for protecting 
consumers from unscrupulous practices. Regulation and 
liability rules, coupled with reputational risks for bad 
behavior that the Internet can amplify, can offer equal, if not 
better, consumer protection without the negative impacts 
on innovation and efficiency that entry barriers entail. 
This white paper is an extension of the Startup Act 
(http://www.kauffman.org/research-and-policy/startup-act.
aspx), in which the Kauffman Foundation outlined ways the 
federal government can stimulate new company formation 
and growth, encouraging economic growth across the 
economy. In a companion to this report, the Foundation 
also will publish a separate template for state and local 
“Startup Acts”—in reality, both executive and legislative 
measures—that would reinforce and amplify the impact of 
startup-friendly policies at the federal level. This particular 
white paper focuses primarily on removing state and local 
impediments to entrepreneurial growth and thus, we hope, 
will make an important contribution to the public policy 
debate in its own right. 
Many of the ideas outlined here also will be included in 
a summary fashion in the companion Kauffman report on a 
broader startup agenda for state and local governments. As 
prior Kauffman research has made clear, new firm formation 
and growth are critical to job creation and economic growth 
in general. The persistently high rates of unemployment 
since the financial crisis of 2007–2008 and the decline in 
formation rate of new employer firms in recent years make 
a startup agenda at all levels of government more urgent 
than ever. 
Legal Barriers to Innovation and 
Growth In Key Sectors
We begin by outlining barriers to innovation and 
entrepreneurship in key sectors which, even if they once 
could be justified, now unnecessarily impede efficient, 
quality competition from alternative providers. Competition 
has been made possible through technological advances 
and better sources of information, the Internet in particular, 
and other factors. It is no longer necessary to use the 
functional equivalent of a shotgun to kill every fly.
The primary challenge in removing these legal barriers 
is that powerful interests with a stake in the status quo 
will resist change as long as possible, while the diverse and 
unorganized beneficiaries of change, new entrants and 
consumers, may not even be aware of how they lose from 
this protection of the existing order. The prospects for even 
moderately paced change under these circumstances are 
doubtful at best, but we nonetheless highlight the steps 
that would be most helpful in the hope that, when the 
appropriate opportunities arise, policymakers will be armed 
and ready to implement some or all of the following ideas. 
Legal Services
States license lawyers and, in the process, impose 
barriers on the delivery of legal services. Anyone who 
engages in the practice of law in any state without a license 
to practice in that state risks substantial penalties. Even 
lawyers who are fully licensed and competent to practice 
law in one state may be penalized for practicing law in 
other states. 
Moreover, the term “practice of law” itself is not 
clearly defined, anywhere. The term potentially extends to 
any specific advice designed for a particular person and 
any representation of another person in court. When the 
American Bar Association attempted in 2002 to create a 
model definition of the practice of law—to bring some 
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clarity to the array of vague and circular approaches 
followed in many states—the language it proposed was so 
overbroad and protectionist that both the Department of 
Justice and the Federal Trade Commission objected. As the 
joint letter opinion concluded, “the proposed definition is 
not in the public interest because the harms it imposes on 
consumers by limiting competition are likely much greater 
than any consumer harm it prevents.”2 
The current licensing requirements impose significant 
barriers on innovation and growth in the legal industry, 
which has annual revenues of $200 billion, even before 
counting the money corporations spend on their lawyer-
employees (Winston, Crandall, and Maheshri, 2011). 
Although licensing regimes vary in detail, their basic 
structure is quite uniform across states: Essentially, anyone 
who wants to convey information designed to guide a 
particular person’s compliance with the law must comply 
with the licensing requirements. This uniformity amounts to 
a functional equivalent of a cartel of state bars and judges 
(who already regulate the legal profession in many states) 
who discourage state competition with respect to attorney 
licensing. This cartel, in turn, imposes several formidable 
requirements on aspirants to the bar. 
First, all who engage in the practice of law, whether or 
not they call themselves “lawyers,” must have three years 
of schooling at a law school (and in many states at an ABA-
approved law school (accreditation is a separate process 
that creates barriers to entry, but that is not a matter 
directly within the control of states). For many individuals 
who know the area of law in which they plan to specialize, 
the three-year curriculum requires excessive and costly 
training in non-essential subjects. For others who haven’t 
yet made this decision, the additional course load may 
be beneficial, but it is not at all clear that formal training 
beyond, say, two years, is more cost-effective than on-the-
job training in particular subject areas. 
In any event, at the end of this three-year course 
of study, law students must take a lengthy bar exam, 
preparation for which often (if not typically) entails paying 
for expensive bar review courses in each state in which they 
plan to practice. Ask most lawyers whether they remember 
much from the bar exam and they are likely to tell you that 
they expunged the memory of it as soon as they left the 
exam room. 
When the aspirant is finally licensed, in most states 
he or she must comply with continuing legal education 
requirements that vary from state to state, have very little 
quality controls, and can require the lawyers to purchase 
still more costly educational materials (although some  
CLE opportunities are free). 
A lawyer who obtains a mandatory license to practice 
in a state then must comply with that state’s rules on 
legal ethics, which also vary across state borders and 
have elements that apparently are intended to prevent 
the practice of law from resembling a “business.” Some 
elements, such as the duty of loyalty to the client and 
avoidance of conflicts of interest, are quite legitimate. 
However, those portions of the ethics rules that bar lawyers 
from practicing law in firms that are owned all or in part 
by non-lawyers have much less justification. For example, 
it is widely believed that, when some relaxation of the 
rules on non-lawyer firm ownership was proposed by an 
American Bar Association Commission on Multidisciplinary 
Practice in 1999–2000, the ultimate defeat of the reform 
proposal (which would have facilitated ownership by service 
providers from multiple professions) in the ABA House of 
Delegates was the result of resistance from the largest law 
firms, which fear competition from the large accounting 
firms). 
These numerous requirements impose substantial 
needless costs. First, the one-size-fits-all approach to 
2. Letter from Department of Justice & Federal Trade Commission to the ABA Task Force on the Model Definition of the Practice of Law  
(December 20, 2002), p. 1. 
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licensing everybody who engages in the broadly defined 
practice of law prevents the development of low-cost 
methods of delivering certain types of legal services. In a 
less-regulated world, these might include legal/business 
counselors for entrepreneurs and small firms and the 
handling of routine legal issues like estate administration, 
divorces, and bankruptcies by people trained in these 
specific areas but who would not have to take the full and 
costly array of legal courses required of traditional law 
students. Such specialized practitioners could be not only 
as good as lawyers for the particular services they perform, 
but, in many cases, actually could be better because they 
would have more relevant, recurring experiences in the very 
specific areas in which they practice.
Second, the broad definition of the practice of law 
implies that sophisticated technologies such as software 
for drafting contracts can be deemed to be providing 
individualized legal advice, and thus potentially in violation 
of state licensing rules (Kobayashi & Ribstein 2011). Such 
software increasingly is capable of integrating consumers’ 
needs, based on their responses to questionnaires, and 
templates to produce contracts and other legal documents 
that may well be of higher quality than those produced by 
general practice lawyers hired by many small businesses 
and middle-class clients. The regulation of the “practice of 
law,” therefore, directly inhibits information technology from 
delivering legal services much more cheaply and perhaps 
even more effectively. 
Third, the ethical rules concerning the practice of law 
prevent the use and development of business structures 
that have already greatly increased the scale and reduced 
the cost of services across other sectors of the economy. In 
particular, the prohibition against having non-lawyer owners 
of firms engaged in law practice inhibits the development 
and diffusion of a wide variety of potentially more efficient 
business structures, including low-cost legal providers, 
publicly financed legal services organizations, and firms 
combining legal and other services such as accounting, 
finance, and business consulting.
These constraints on innovation result from the broad 
nature of the regulation of the practice of law, but also of 
the regulatory structure that entitles each state to separately 
regulate what could and should be a national legal 
information industry. The current licensing system potentially 
subjects those practicing law to multiple regulatory 
requirements while inhibiting parties’ ability to choose from 
competing regulatory regimes.
Consumers, entrepreneurs, and established businesses 
all pay for the excess cost and barriers to innovation created 
by an archaic and effectively cartelized system of regulation. 
The most recent comprehensive empirical analysis estimates 
that the total annual cost of these barriers is $10 billion per 
year (Winston, Crandall, and Maheshri, 2011). 
Health Services
The medical profession, like the legal profession, 
broadly regulates the practice of medicine. Just as the 
regulation of lawyers requires extensive training even for 
certain types of jobs that do not require it, so, too, physician 
licensing laws prevent those without extensive medical 
training from dispensing relatively simple advice without the 
same advanced training required for more complex services.
To their credit, twenty-three states allow “nurse 
practitioners” to practice without supervision by a physician. 
These professionals generally must take twelve to sixteen 
months of classes after college, including clinical courses 
that provide experience treating patients. Although they 
earn less than half of what physicians make, studies show 
their care on routine matters is at least as good as that 
given by physicians.3  The example of nurse practitioners 
suggests that the medical profession may, in some respects, 
represent a better licensing model than the legal profession 
3. See Harris (2011).
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does. Instead of barring everybody from engaging in the 
generally defined “practice of medicine” unless they have 
had extensive education and examination, the medical 
profession recognizes specialties such as nurse practitioners 
or chiropractors, who can offer quality patient care in 
appropriate circumstances at lower cost. State medical 
licensing laws, however, are still far from optimal. We 
discuss below some ways federal law may be used to break 
down unreasonable state barriers. But the example of 
gradations of licensing, even in the important and high-
risk field of medicine, suggests that uniform and inflexible 
lawyer licensing is not the only possible model.
Drug Approval and Liability
Before a drug manufacturer can sell a drug to the 
public, the drug must undergo extensive testing and 
approval by the federal Food and Drug Administration. 
This process requires that the drug be not only safe, but 
also effective. After the drug is sold to the public, drug 
manufacturers continue to face litigation for harms caused 
by the drug they may or may not have foreseen prior to sale. 
The cost of the testing and approval process, risk of lost 
research and development costs from non-approval, and 
potential tort liability for approved products significantly 
reduce the returns from the development of new drugs 
by reducing the number of drugs that can be expected to 
be profitable. The costs of tort liability for FDA-approved 
drugs, in particular, are exacerbated by the exposure of 
pharmaceutical companies to claims under numerous state 
laws. Because courts focus on several different factors in 
determining which state’s law applies, a drug company 
may not be able to determine at the time of manufacture 
which legal standard will apply to its conduct. Markets 
clearly are a reasonable alternative to some regulation. 
Consumers have good reason to buy drugs only from 
reputable firms. Firms therefore have strong incentives 
to develop and nurture reputations for safe and effective 
products. Consumers also will be reluctant to buy drugs 
without adequate information. Unlike the early days of 
drug sales, which gave rise to the Food and Drug Act, 
significant information from sellers, competitors, health 
organizations, and other third-party intermediaries and 
other consumers is cheaply and readily available on the 
Internet. Pharmaceutical companies will find little market for 
their products if they refuse to disclose information about 
them. 
The question is how much and what type of 
regulation efficiently balances the risk of harm from bad 
products against the potentially significant loss of valuable 
innovation from over-regulation. The current system 
poses a high likelihood of over-regulation because of its 
combination of the costly FDA drug approval process with 
the potentially high costs of state tort liability. Federal 
regulators have a significant incentive to over-regulate 
because they get none of the advantages from beneficial 
drugs but potentially bear the blame for approving products 
that prove unsafe. State tort law is particularly problematic 
because it exposes manufacturers to unpredictable risks, the 
high administrative costs of the U.S. legal process, and state 
competition to attract litigation, which can benefit lawyers 
at consumers’ expense. Further, regulators face strong 
incentives to resolve doubts about safety against approval 
because they are more likely to be blamed and punished for 
unsafe drugs than for the drugs that consumers never see.
In light of the high costs of the tort system, it seems 
clear that tort liability need not be combined with FDA 
regulation in its current form. If FDA regulation is retained, 
one possible minimal reform is for states to deny punitive 
damages in state tort litigation for drugs that have been 
approved by the FDA. Alternatively, or in addition to this 
measure, the federal government should consider dropping 
the efficacy requirement for FDA approval and letting the 
market determine that outcome. 
Education
Admittedly, there are many aspects of effective K–12 
reform. One concerns the optimal compensation and 
incentive system for teachers. On the one hand, lockstep 
seniority compensation does not reward good performance. 
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On the other hand, tying teacher compensation to student 
performance on standardized tests can have perverse 
impacts: teaching to the test and thus stifling creativity, or 
providing incentives for cheating, which has occurred all too 
frequently in school systems across the country.
K–12 education in the United States has other 
notorious shortcomings. Although the field seems ripe for 
innovation, new developments have been limited as a result 
of powerful resistance by teachers’ unions. In addition, 
rigid state laws defining who can teach students prevent 
many highly motivated and experienced people from other 
walks of life from becoming teachers in their second or third 
careers. 
There also are questions concerning the measurement 
of student performance, teaching methods, and curriculum. 
The main response to these challenges has been the 
imposition of rigid national testing standards through the 
federal No Child Left Behind law. While debate certainly will 
continue over the merits of this law, there is clearly room for 
more reform ideas.
Charter schools already provide valuable 
experimentation and helpful competition with public 
schools. Yet laws in many states sharply restrict approval 
of charter schools. Apart from the problems this causes in 
states themselves, these laws also may impede the growth 
of national charter school organizations that could take 
advantage of economies of scale to develop and test new 
types of certification, curricula, student testing, and teacher 
compensation. The patchwork of state regulation has stifled 
competition and limited innovation in public education to 
the detriment of its customers—its students and our  
future generations.
Other Occupational Restrictions
Occupational licensing has spread through the 
economy like a virus, creating new regulated professions 
daily, including, among many others, witches, tour guides, 
horse teeth floaters, and cat groomers. Licensing regulation 
enables incumbent providers to thwart competition and 
innovation by raising entry barriers to entrepreneurs who 
may be able to deliver these services at lower cost and/or 
higher quality. To the extent public safety is a concern, tort 
liability for negligence and fraud would adequately protect 
the public. 
These are not new observations. The costs and 
inefficiencies of occupational licensing regimes were 
thoroughly documented in a comprehensive study 
conducted by Morris Kleiner in 2006 (Kleiner) and updated 
in Kleiner’s collaborative work with President Obama’s 
choice for Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers 
(Kleiner and Krueger, 2010). In 2008, nearly 30 percent of 
the U.S. workforce was required to hold a license, up from 
just 10 percent in 1970 (Kleiner, 2011). The challenge for 
state and local governments is to begin acting on the ample 
body of research that indicates the inefficiencies and costs 
of excessive occupational licensing. 
Finance
The refinements and translations of ideas into 
commercially viable goods or services requires capital. The 
federal securities laws allow startup firms to raise money 
by providing a mechanism that guarantees to investors 
that the firms’ disclosures are truthful. However, if taken 
too far, these disclosure obligations can be a powerful drag 
on innovation and entrepreneurship by actually impeding 
fundraising by new firms. The federal Securities Act of 1933 
requires that a firm issuing a “security” must undergo an 
extensive, costly, and tricky registration process. The term 
“security” is a large umbrella term that courts have held 
to include “investment contracts,” which can be any kind 
of investment scheme, no matter how small. The Act, as 
well as decades of rules promulgated by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission, provides a wide array of complex 
exemptions that can trap legally unwary entrepreneurs. 
The federal securities laws have created a legal 
minefield for even the smallest businesses seeking any sort 
of funding. An example is “crowd funding,” by which small 
entrepreneurs can seek small contributions from many 
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investors through Internet sites such as Kiva, Kickstarter, 
and IndieGoGo. These fundraising efforts may constitute 
securities offerings under the Securities Act of 1933, thus 
subjecting the entrepreneurs to registration requirements 
unless they are able to find an exemption. Further, the 
websites themselves are subject to potential liability as 
brokers or investment advisers. (We note, approvingly, 
that the Administration has proposed some regulatory 
adjustments in this area, and that there is some interest and 
support in Congress for widening existing exemptions to 
permit more crowd funding).
The burdens imposed by the securities laws on small 
firms do not stop with initial fundraising. The Sarbanes-
Oxley Act imposes onerous monitoring requirements, 
particularly regarding internal controls auditing. These 
requirements affect smaller firms especially because the cost 
of establishing monitoring systems are similar regardless of 
firm size, and because younger and more innovative firms 
tend to have more challenges anticipating and solving 
internal controls issues. Even assuming that internal controls 
reporting helps investors and thus decreases the costs of 
capital (holding other factors constant), at some point the 
direct costs of internal controls and the indirect costs of 
discouraging risk-taking exceed the benefits of reporting. 
Considerations such as these led Congress to include an 
exemption from audited internal controls reporting in the 
Dodd-Frank financial reform law for firms with less than $75 
million in market capitalization. However, this exemption 
still leaves many relatively small public firms subject to 
mandates better suited to larger firms, and deters exempted 
firms from growing out of the exemption.
The Kauffman Foundation has promoted an even 
better solution to Sarbanes-Oxley, one developed by 
Professors Henry Butler and Larry Ribstein. That idea, at 
least as proposed in the Startup Act, would permit the 
shareholders of firms with capitalization under $1 billion 
to choose whether their firms will be SOX-compliant, and 
specifically whether to comply with the internal controls 
auditing requirements of that law. An alternative approach 
would be to give all newly public firms the ability to opt out 
of SOX compliance within, say, the first five years of going 
public. This second alternative would not limit choice to 
firms below a certain size, and thus would give companies 
with much larger IPOs or later valuations the ability to 
choose whether to comply. In either case, the theory behind 
shareholder choice is that SOX was enacted to protect 
shareholders. Why not permit shareholders to make the 
benefit-cost calculation whether SOX compliance benefits 
the company’s share price (or its volatility) or not? This is 
surely a better alternative than imposing a one-size-fits-all 
benefit-cost determination by federal policy makers.
Approaches for Reducing/Eliminating Barriers to 
Innovation and Entry
We now turn to new approaches to lawmaking that 
can broadly reduce barriers to entry for entrepreneurs and 
encourage competition among existing businesses.
Some of these suggestions involve relatively 
straightforward recommendations to Congress to modify 
federal regulation. The more interesting challenge, however, 
is how to reduce or eliminate entry barriers in law, health 
services, and education that are maintained by states and 
localities. The balance of this essay surveys the main options, 
indicating our preference for one in particular, namely, 
mandatory mutual recognition, and closes by discussing 
how productive change at the state and local levels might 
come about.
Limits on Federal Regulation
Some federal regulation, despite laudable objectives, 
overreached and imposes burdens that disproportionately 
affect small firms. Examples already cited include the 1933 
Securities Act and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, both of which 
impair firms’ ability to raise capital. 
Modifications of these particular laws can only be 
implemented at the federal level. However, legislation is not 
necessarily the only option. For example, while statutory 
change would be necessary to provide shareholder choice 
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for firm compliance with the provisions of SOX, regulatory 
change by the SEC could remedy the crowd-sourcing 
problem. 
More broadly, all new major federal rules (those with 
an impact of $100 million or more, as defined by the Office 
of Management and Budget or the Congressional Budget 
Office) should be subject to sunset and review requirements, 
while all new regulations should pass a common-sense 
benefit-cost test. Each of these reforms is featured in the 
proposed federal Startup Act. 
State Experimentation 
State regulation can be obstructive, particularly in 
such areas as professional licensing and liability, which 
in turn affects businesses nationwide. However, state 
experimentation can be positive as well. As already noted, 
some states have liberalized licensing of nurse practitioners 
and charter schools. Over time, as more positive experiences 
are gained from these experiments, the lessons will, we 
hope, spread to other states. State regulation also can offer 
alternative approaches that are more likely than federal 
regulation to take into account diverse local and regional 
situations and to evolve to reflect ever-changing conditions. 
The broad challenge is to rein in regulation that unduly 
restricts innovation, such as the regulation of lawyers and 
health professionals discussed above, while encouraging 
useful state experimentation. To some extent, market forces 
and the mobility of people and firms can effectuate change 
over time. Regulated parties can avoid states with harsh 
regulation more easily than they can federal regulation. 
Their customers and consumers who are left behind can be 
a political force for deregulation (O’Hara & Ribstein, 2009).
State reform can take a long time, however, especially 
when interests that benefit from the status quo almost 
certainly will defend it against meaningful change. The 
potential role of the federal government in meaningfully 
accelerating this process is, then, a natural point of interest.
One potential means is constitutional litigation. 
Baseless regulation can run afoul of the due process or 
equal protection clauses. Discrimination against interstate 
commerce may be unconstitutional under the “dormant” 
commerce clause. While the Supreme Court may use 
these doctrines to limit the worst regulations, doctrinal 
development at the constitutional level is a slow and 
uncertain process. Its pace obviously depends on the 
composition of the Court and, in any event, is inherently 
slowed by the doctrine of stare decisis, which gives 
deference to existing precedents.
The following sections suggest two alternative 
approaches by which the federal government’s power could 
be harnessed to speed up the dismantling or easing of 
onerous state rules that limit entrepreneurial activity. 
Federal Preemption 
One obvious approach to controlling state barriers to 
innovation is for the federal government simply to preempt 
state laws that limit competition in the areas already 
identified and substitute a single, more entrepreneur-friendly 
law that applies nationwide. Preemption would bypass 
the slow process of state evolution and fill the substantial 
space left by constitutional protections, but it also runs the 
risk of imposing ill-suited requirements on all states. Broad 
preemption also would stop useful state experimentation 
and very likely not adapt well to changes in technologies 
and voter preferences. Moreover, there may be formidable 
difficulties assembling a coalition at the federal level to 
overturn state statutes that are supported by powerful local 
interest groups. 
Further, Congress also often does not make the 
preemptive effect of federal laws clear, leaving a significant 
role for federal courts and administrative agencies to 
interpret Congressional intent. The subsequent judicial and 
agency actions may depend as much on a decision-maker’s 
regulatory philosophy as on the language of the federal 
statute. A recent memorandum issued by President Obama 
illustrated the importance of regulatory philosophy to 
preemption by articulating: 
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“…the general policy of my Administration 
[is] that preemption of State law by executive 
departments and agencies should be undertaken 
only with full consideration of the legitimate 
prerogatives of the States and with a sufficient 
legal basis for preemption. Executive departments 
and agencies should be mindful that in our 
Federal system, the citizens of the several States 
have distinctive circumstances and values, and 
that in many instances it is appropriate for them 
to apply to themselves rules and principles that 
reflect these circumstances and values. As Justice 
Brandeis explained more than 70 years ago, ‘[i]t is 
one of the happy incidents of the federal system 
that a single courageous state may, if its citizens 
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social 
and economic experiments without risk to the 
rest of the country.’”4 
There is an inherent tension, however, between the 
salutary “laboratory” Justice Brandeis envisioned and a 
single powerful state, the federal government, effectively 
imposing its regulatory views on the whole country. 
Although the Presidential memorandum recognizes the 
possibility of a “legal basis” for preemption, administrative 
agencies have significant discretion in finding such a 
basis, and the memorandum places a thumb on the scale 
against exercising this discretion to preempt. This can be 
significant in a case like Wyeth v. Levine (2009) where the 
Supreme Court allowed a case to proceed against a drug 
manufacturer based on an FDA-approved label because 
Congress had not explicitly preempted liability under  
state law. 
One possible approach is for the courts to adopt the 
opposite presumption from that suggested in the President’s 
memorandum in certain types of cases where federal 
action is especially justified to remove state law barriers to 
interstate commerce. This would effectuate the Commerce 
Clause’s purpose by empowering Congress to lift excessive 
state law barriers to interstate commerce, such as state 
tort liability for drug-related health problems and injuries 
(O’Connor & Ribstein, 2011). 
An alternative approach would be to enable 
manufacturers to choose between regulation and tort 
liability. Where the manufacturer elects FDA regulation, tort 
liability would be preempted. A manufacturer that bypasses 
the FDA approval process would be subject to state tort 
liability and required to clearly disclose the lack of FDA 
approval to consumers (Rubin). This could give innovative 
drugs an additional path to market by letting manufacturers 
that are confident in the safety of their drugs bypass 
regulators who may have over-cautious tendencies. 
Federal Protection of State Experimentation 
A middle ground between a single preemptive federal 
law and continuing experimentation at the state level 
would be for the federal government to set ground rules for 
states’ enforcement of other states’ regulatory decisions. 
This approach could take advantage of state diversity and 
experimentation while invoking limited federal power to 
protect firms from the potential chaos of multiple state 
regulatory regimes. 
The Supreme Court decided on such an approach for 
consumer credit more than three decades ago. Prior to 
1978, state and national banks were subject to state usury 
laws. Not only did usury rates vary from state to state, but 
the rule concerning which usury rate applied, the state 
of the borrower’s residence, the place of contract, or the 
bank’s home state, also varied (O’Connor & Ribstein, 2011). 
However, in the 1978 Marquette decision, the Supreme 
Court upheld the National Bank Act, which permitted 
national banks to charge the rate determined by the state in 
4. Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, May 20, 2009, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/
Presidential-Memorandum-Regarding-Preemption.
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which the bank is chartered. This rule was later extended to 
state-chartered banks and credit card fees. 
The European Union has taken a similar approach. 
The Treaty of Rome guaranteed the “four freedoms” of 
movement of goods, services and establishment, persons 
and citizenship, and capital.5  These general principles 
underlie “mutual recognition,” a standard established 
by the European Court of Justice, which limits the extent 
to which European member state laws can be applied 
to burden commerce among member states. In general, 
host countries cannot bar people or firms based in other 
countries from doing business locally or discriminate against 
them in favor of local firms.6 For example, in contrast to 
the regulation of attorneys in the United States, a lawyer 
licensed in one European country cannot be barred from 
practice by another. However, the “host” country can apply 
some of the rules it applies to local firms to “foreign” firms, 
as well. 
The United States could follow a similar approach for 
state licensing by mandating a “driver’s license” or “single 
passport” model to replace the current state licensing 
requirements, which vary drastically. This would permit 
providers of legal, health, and education services authorized 
in some states to engage in the same activities in other 
states. 
More specifically, the “driver’s license” approach would 
require a state to authorize any professional licensed in his 
or her home state to practice in the host state. For example, 
a person licensed as a “business counselor” in Illinois could 
offer certain legal, accounting, and financial services in any 
state, including one that would require residents offering 
such services to obtain a license to practice law. A similar 
approach would apply to nurse practitioners or chains of 
charter schools.
Such a “driver’s license” or “mutual recognition” 
approach has several advantages over complete federal 
preemption. Most importantly, it does not impose a uniform 
model on all states, but rather lets states experiment with 
different approaches. This enables firms to pick regulatory 
regimes that best suit their businesses and the states 
to compete to provide the optimal regulatory balance. 
Productive change may occur more quickly if one or a few 
states make bold changes that catch on throughout the 
country, as opposed to trying to assemble a coalition of 
sufficient strength at the federal level to mandate a single 
federal law. 
The main challenge of such an approach is to permit 
state experimentation without facilitating a “race to the 
bottom,” where the most lax state regime dominates. 
Each state has incentives to regulate the safety of services 
rendered by locally based practitioners to the states’ own 
residents. Under mutual recognition, these incentives would 
apply to practitioners’ licenses in other states. Furthermore, 
it is important to recognize that host states could regulate 
unsafe conduct without using their licensing laws to bar 
entry to the licensees of other states.
Although mutual recognition would continue to allow 
states to restrict the activities of their resident practitioners, 
it could put significant pressure on states to liberalize these 
restrictions. Once “foreign” providers of services are doing 
business in a “host” state that may not permit its own 
residents to practice under such circumstances, consumers 
and potential providers may press legislators to level the 
playing field so that home-state providers can offer the 
same services under the same conditions. This pressure 
would counteract the strong vested interests favoring 
existing barriers to entry. 
Indeed, entrenched interest groups, perceiving 
mutual recognition as the proverbial nose under the tent 
5. See Treaty Establishing the European Community, Nov. 10, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) Title 3.
6. EC Treaty Articles 49, 50(3) and 54.
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of even more controversial steps, may vigorously oppose 
federal regulation mandating this approach. On the other 
hand, mutual recognition might emerge as a workable 
compromise between those favoring complete federal 
preemption of state law and those insisting on maintaining 
the current state barriers to innovation. 
The driver’s license approach would not solve all 
problems of multistate regulation. States still might impose 
diverse and burdensome disclosure measures or other 
regulations that could impede innovation by national firms. 
However, there are two broad ways in which sensibly 
tailored and limited federal preemption can address this 
problem while still allowing state variation.  
First, federal law could limit particular types of state 
regulation that create the greatest barriers to innovative 
national firms. For example, federal law could provide for a 
driver’s license or mutual recognition approach and clarify 
which activities are governed by the practitioner’s or firm’s 
home state law, mandate certain minimum disclosure 
requirements, and preempt state disclosure rules. Federal 
law then could promote consumer awareness of the 
applicable regulatory regime, similar to the notice of federal 
drug approval discussed above, and then let the market 
evaluate the various regimes. Since most providers likely 
will be regulated under local law, a notice that some other 
law applies is likely to put consumers on guard. Providers 
will have an incentive to obtain local licenses except where 
another regime provides significant beneficial flexibility. This 
regime would be similar to current business association 
law, where firms are subject to the governance law of the 
chartering state and only to federal disclosure law, at least 
for large and interstate transactions. 
Second, an alternative to the driver’s license approach, 
which may be appropriate in some contexts, is to enable 
firms to obtain federal charters for the lines of business we 
have discussed. States then would be required to recognize 
this charter and any accompanying information disclosure 
regime. This “dual chartering” approach has been used 
in the banking industry since the Civil War and could be 
adopted easily for legal, health, and education services, 
among others. As with the driver’s license, federal chartering 
could put competitive pressure on excessively strict state 
regulation.
Conclusion: The Political Economy 
of Change
This essay has discussed some approaches to changing 
state and federal law to reduce legal barriers to entry for 
innovators and entrepreneurs. In discussing this, one must 
ask the question of how to reduce political barriers erected 
by entrenched incumbent interest groups. There are several 
ways such a challenge could be overcome. 
First, over time the electorate must be educated 
concerning the social costs of imposing barriers to entry 
for innovators. The interest groups that support these 
laws are quick to warn about the risks of new products, 
services, and business structures. It is important to counter 
these arguments by illustrating more clearly the costs of 
barriers to entry. These educational efforts might have 
particular traction at a time when society is searching for 
new ways to create jobs without spending more taxpayer 
money. Education ultimately convinced voters to accept 
deregulation of the transportation industry and could work 
now to open up other industries to innovation. 
Second, the accumulating and increasing burden of 
more state and federal laws eventually will reach a point 
where even those who once were sympathetic with the 
goals of such regulation will recognize the costs. This 
includes large corporations stymied by increased regulation, 
consumers blocked from access to low-cost legal and 
medical services and products, and families deprived of 
better education for their children. Indeed, the need to drop 
barriers to innovation has become a civil rights issue in 
some of these contexts.
Third, increased global competition and the quickening 
pace of technology mean that government no longer 
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can contain innovation at the behest of strong interest 
groups. Consumers increasingly can obtain the goods and 
services they want that slip through the regulatory walls 
in the United States and abroad. For example, the United 
Kingdom, Europe, and Australia are deregulating their legal 
professions and soon will demonstrate the full potential 
of legal services and information products that are barred 
in the United States. It will be difficult to keep the doors 
barred in this country when consumers see what is available 
and functioning in other countries. Indeed, a working group 
of the American Bar Association published a report in April 
2011 seeking feedback on different ownership structures 
for law firms.7 
Fourth, these innovators, coupled with the rise of a 
new generation that has no vested interest in the status 
quo, will form interest groups that rival and ultimately 
exceed the power of the passing generation. At some point, 
this new wave will create a new and more innovative and 
entrepreneurial status quo. 
7. American Bar Association (2011). 
Members of the  










4801 ROCKHILL ROAD 
KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI  64110 
816-932-1000
www.kauffman.org
0112350FP
